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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the influence of trust on the assimilation of acquired information into an
agent’s belief. By use of modal logic, we semantically and axiomatically characterize the relationship
among belief, information acquisition and trust. The belief and information acquisition operators are
respectively represented by KD45 and KD normal modalities, whereas trust is denoted by a modal
operator with minimal semantics. One characteristic axiom of the basic system is if agent i believes
that agent j has told him the truth of p and he trusts the judgement of j on p, then he will also
believe p. In addition to the basic system, some variants and further axioms for trust and information
acquisition are also presented to show the expressive richness of the logic. The applications of the
logic to computer security and database reasoning are also suggested by its connection with some
previous works.
 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In the internet age, infoglut has become a serious problem in information retrieval and
search. If a keyword is input into a commonly-used search engine, it is not unusual to
get back a list of thousands of web pages. Thus, the real difficulty is not how to find
information, but how to find useful information. Recently, a great number of software
agents has been designed to circumvent the problem. Agents can search the web to find
and filter out information matching the user’s need. However, not all internet information
sources are trustworthy. Some web sites are out-of-date, some news media provide
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erroneous information, and some people even intentionally spread rumors or deceive by
anonymity. From the viewpoint of agent societies, each agent plays both the role of
information provider and of receiver. Consequently, the information search process can be
seen as the communication between two agents. A receiver has to decide whether he/she
can believe the received information according to his/her trust in the provider.
In [39], an agent is characterized by mental attitudes, such as knowledge, belief,
obligation, and commitment. This view of agents, in accordance with the intentional
stance proposed in [19], has been widely accepted as a convenient way to analyze and
describe complex systems [49]. The model of these attitudes has been the traditional
concern of philosophical logic, such as epistemic logic, doxastic logic [24], and deontic
logic [2]. Some logics derived from philosophical analysis have been applied to the
modeling of AI and distributed systems [20,35]. In most of these logics, the mental
attitudes are represented by modal operators, and their meanings are in general given by
the possible world semantics for modal logic [10]. Following the approach, we would like
to propose a doxastic logic with modalities for representing the trusting attitudes and the
information transmission action between agents, and then discuss how one agent’s belief is
influenced by his/her acquired information and trust toward other agents. More specifically,
in traditional doxastic logic, Biϕ means that agent i believes ϕ, so we will add to the logic
additional modal operators Tij and Iij . The intended meaning of Tij ϕ is that agent i trusts
the judgement of j on the truth of ϕ, whereas Iij ϕ means agent i acquires information ϕ
from j .
In the remainder of the paper, we will first give a general logic that meets the above-
mentioned requirement. The syntax, semantics, and a basic axiomatic system of the logic is
presented in Section 2. In Sections 3 and 4, some additional assumptions will be considered
to produce variants of the basic logic. In Section 5, we compare our logic with some related
works in multi-agent systems as well as in computer security and database management
contexts, demonstrating the potential application of our framework beyond multi-agent
systems. Finally, we conclude the paper with some perspectives for further research.
2. The basic logic BIT
The basic logic of belief, information acquisition, and trust (BIT) is an extension of the
traditional doxastic logic, which is in turn a multi-agent version of the KD45 system of the
normal modal logic [10]. Assume we have n agents and a set Φ0 of countably many atomic
propositions, then the set of well-formed formulas (wff) for the logic BIT is the least set
containing Φ0 and closed under the following formation rules:
• if ϕ is a wff, so are ¬ϕ, Biϕ, Iij ϕ, and Tij ϕ for all 1 i = j  n, and
• if ϕ and ψ are wffs, then ϕ ∨ψ is, too.
As usual, other classical Boolean connectives ∧ (and), ⊃ (implication), ≡ (equivalence),
	 (tautology), and ⊥ (contradiction) can be defined as abbreviations.
The possible-worlds semantics provides a general framework for the modeling of
knowledge and belief [20]. In the semantics, an agent’s belief state corresponds to the
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extent to which he can determine what world he is in. In a given world, the belief state
determines the set of worlds that the agent considers possible. Then an agent is said to
believe a fact ϕ if ϕ is true in all worlds in this set. Analogously, the information of
an agent acquired from another agent constrains the possibility of the worlds according
to the acquired information. However, since an agent perceives the possibility that other
agents may be unreliable, he will not blindly believe all acquired information. Thus, the
set of possible worlds according to acquired information from some particular agent may
be different from that associated with his belief state. Of course, since an agent may lie,
the information of other agents acquired from him may not be compatible with what he
believes. On the other hand, the semantics of trust is relatively more “syntactic” and less
restrictive. Though trust in general depends on some rational factors such as the honesty
and credibility of the trusted agent, it also usually contains some irrational or emotional
components. Since the assessment of credibility of an agent can only depend on his past
records, we can not guarantee that the agent does not provide any wrong information in
the future. Even very respectable news media may make some errors, so any trust must be
accompanied with risk. This means that we will only impose minimal constraint on the set
of statements on which an agent trusts another agent’s judgement.
From the semantics, the trust operators do not have logical closure property whereas the
belief and information acquisition operators do. The asymmetry arises from our modeling
of agents as perfect reasoners. The beliefs of a perfect reasoner are closed under logical
consequence and, since an agent can reason from the acquired information, when he
receives ϕ from another agent, he also implicitly receives the consequences implied by
ϕ. However, trust is a totally different thing. When an agent trusts another on ϕ, he does
not necessarily trust the latter on all consequences derived from ϕ, even if he is aware
of all these consequences due to his reasoning capability. A real example to illustrate the
phenomenon is given in Section 3 (Example 1).
According to the informal discussion above, the formal semantics for Bi and Iij
is the Kripke semantics for normal modal operators, whereas that for Tij is the so-
called minimal (or neighborhood) semantics [10]. Formally, a BIT model is a tuple
(W,π, (Bi )1in, (Iij )1i =jn, (Tij )1i =jn), where
• W is a set of possible worlds,
• π :Φ0 → 2W is a truth assignment mapping each atomic proposition to the set of
worlds in which it is true,
• Bi ⊆W ×W is a serial, transitive and Euclidean binary relation1 on W ,
• Iij ⊆W ×W is a serial relation on W ,
• Tij ⊆W × 2W is a binary relation between W and the power set of W .
In the following, we will use some standard notations for binary relations. IfR⊆A×B
is a binary relation between A and B , we will write R(a, b) for (a, b) ∈R and R(a) for
the subset {b ∈ B |R(a, b)}. Thus for any w ∈W , Bi (w) and Iij (w) will be subsets of
1 A relation R on W is serial if ∀w∃uR(w,u), transitive if ∀w,u,v(R(w,u) ∧R(u, v)⇒R(w,v)), and
Euclidean if ∀w,u,v(R(w,u)∧R(w,v)⇒R(u, v)).
34 C.-J. Liau / Artificial Intelligence 149 (2003) 31–60
W , whereas Tij (w) is a subset of 2W . Informally, Bi (w) is the set of worlds that agent
i considers possible under w according to his belief, whereas Iij (w) is what the agent i
considers possible according to the information acquired from j . On the other hand, since
each subset of W is the semantic counterpart of a proposition, for any S ⊆W , S ∈ Tij (w)
means that agent i trust j ’s judgement on the truth of the proposition corresponding to
S. The informal intuition is reflected in our formal definition of satisfaction relation.
Let M = (W,π, (Bi )1in, (Iij )1i =jn, (Tij )1i =jn) be a BIT model and Φ be the
set of wffs, then the satisfaction relation |=M⊆ W × Φ is defined by the following
inductive rules (we will use the infix notation for the relation and omit the subscript M
for convenience):
(1) w |= p iff w ∈ π(p) when p ∈Φ0,
(2) w |= ¬ϕ iff w |= ϕ,
(3) w |= ϕ ∨ψ iff w |= ϕ or w |=ψ ,
(4) w |= Biϕ iff for all u ∈ Bi (w), u |= ϕ,
(5) w |= Iij ϕ iff for all u ∈ Iij (w), u |= ϕ,
(6) w |= Tij ϕ iff |ϕ| ∈ Tij (w), where |ϕ| = {u ∈W : u |= ϕ} is called the truth set of ϕ.
As usual, we can define validity from the satisfaction relation. A wff ϕ is valid in M ,
denoted by |=M ϕ, if |ϕ| =W . Let C be a class of BIT models, then |=C ϕ if for all M ∈C,
we have |=M ϕ. Let Σ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆Φ , then Σ |=C ϕ denotes that for all M ∈C and w in M , if
for all ψ ∈Σ,w |=M ψ then w |=M ϕ.
So far, we have defined a BIT model so that the relations Bi ,Iij , and Tij are completely
independent. This means that the information an agent acquired from other agents may
be completely irrelevant to his belief, so the agent will not benefit from communication
with others. This is definitely not what we want to model. Though we do not want
an agent to believe blindly what other agents tell him, it is indeed inevitable that his
belief should be influenced by the information he acquired from agents he trusts. Based
on this consideration, we will impose some constraints on the BIT models. Let M =
(W,π, (Bi )1in, (Iij )1i,jn, (Tij )1i =jn) be a BIT model, then M is called basic
if it satisfies the following two constraints for all 1 i = j  n and w ∈W ,
(m1) for all S ∈ Tij (w), if Bi ◦ Iij (w) ⊆ S, then Bi (w) ⊆ S, where ◦ denotes the
composition operator between two binary relations,2
(m2) Tij (w)=⋂u∈Bi (w) Tij (u).
The class of basic BIT models is denoted by BA. The constraint (m2) essentially
requires that an agent be self-aware of his/her trust towards other agents. This is a natural
requirement for agents’ mental attitudes because our agents should have some kind of
introspective capability. On the other hand, (m1) makes a connection among the three
classes of modal operators. It means that if an agent i believes that he has acquired the
information ϕ from j and he trusts the judgement of j on the truth of ϕ, then he should
2 R1 ◦R2 = {(x, y) | ∃z((x, z) ∈R1 ∧ (z, y) ∈R2)}.
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1. Axioms:
P: all tautologies of the propositional calculus




I1: [Iij ϕ ∧ Iij (ϕ ⊃ψ)] ⊃ Iij ψ
I2: ¬Iij⊥
C1: BiIij ϕ ∧ Tij ϕ ⊃ Biϕ
C2: Tij ϕ ≡ BiTij ϕ
2. Rules of Inference:
R1 (Modus ponens, MP): from  ϕ and  ϕ ⊃ψ infer ψ
R2 (Generalization, Gen): from  ϕ infer  Biϕ and  Iij ϕ
R3: from  ϕ ≡ψ infer  Tij ϕ ≡ Tij ψ
Fig. 1. The axiomatic system BA for basic BIT.
assimilate the information into his belief base. These two constraints are represented by
two natural axioms in our axiomatic system for basic BIT logic. The axiomatic system,
called BA, is presented in Fig. 1.
The axioms B1–B4 correspond to the KD45 system for doxastic operators Bi . B1
means that the agents are perfect logical reasoners, so their beliefs are closed under logical
consequence. B2–B4, corresponding to the serial, transitive and Euclidean properties of
the Bi relation, stipulate respectively the consistency, positive introspection, and negative
introspection of the agent’s belief. The axioms I1 and I2 form the KD system for the
information acquisition operators. Here, we assume that the operators describe not only the
explicit information an agent directly acquires but also all consequences that are implicitly
implied by it. Thus, if an agent acquires information ϕ, he also gets all logical consequence
of ϕ at the same time. This is just what I1 asserts. Under the assumption, a source providing
contradictory information will be useless, so we use axiom I2 to exclude the possibility that
an agent can acquire contradictory information from a single source. However, note that
this does not rule out the possibility that an agent can acquire contradictory information
from multiple sources. Indeed, it is the notion of trust that can help to select what to believe
when such a situation occurs. Finally, the connection axioms C1 and C2 correspond to the
basic constraints (m1) and (m2) on the BIT models. C1 ties all three kinds of operators
together and states when the acquired information should be assimilated into the beliefs,
whereas C2 describes the mental states of an agent when he/she trusts the judgement of
other agents. The Gen rule assures that valid wff is believed and acquired a prior, while
R3 asserts that if an agent trusts another agent’s judgement on some wff, then his trust is
independent of the syntactic form of the wff.
Note that all axioms in this paper are interpreted as static constraints on the agent’s
belief, acquired information, and trust. If we interpret C1 dynamically, for example, as “if
at time t0, agent i believes that j has told him ϕ and i trusts j on the judgement of ϕ, then
at time t0 + 1, agent i will believe ϕ.”, then this axiom does not naturally hold. If at time
t0, agent has believed ¬ϕ, then when receiving the information ϕ from j , he will face the
dilemma of updating his belief or trust on j . He may decide not to trust j any more while
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insisting on his belief in ¬ϕ or give up his belief in ¬ϕ while keeping his trust in j . The
dynamic interpretation of the axiom only holds in the latter case. Nevertheless, no matter
which way agent i has chosen, the final status should satisfy the axiom C1.
The derivability in the system is defined as follows. LetΣ∪{ϕ} ⊆Φ , then ϕ is derivable
from Σ in the system BA, written as Σ BA ϕ, if there is a finite sequence ϕ1, . . . , ϕm
such that every ϕi is an instance of an axiom schema in BA, a wff in Σ , or obtainable
from earlier ϕj ’s by application of a rule in BA. When Σ = ∅, we simply write BA ϕ.
The system BA is said to be sound if BA ϕ implies |=BA ϕ and complete if the converse
holds.
Theorem 1. The axiomatic system BA is sound and complete.
Proof. The proof is based on the standard technique of canonical model construction in
modal logic [10]. To make the paper self-contained, we include all proofs of this and the
following theorems in Appendix A. ✷
3. Properties of trust
In the preceding section, we have described a set of basic axioms for BIT logic. In the
system, we impose minimal constraints on the semantics of trust operators. However, there
are still some useful theorems derivable in the system. For example, we have




Bi(Iij ϕ ∧ Iik¬ϕ)∧ (Tij ϕ ⊃ Tik¬ϕ)
]⊃¬Tij ϕ. (2)
The first says that if an agent acquired contradictory information from two sources, then
not both sources are trusted by him, and the second further indicates that if one source is at
least as trustworthy as the other, then the latter is not trusted. A more general form of (1)
is the following derived rule:
ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕm ⊃¬ϕm+1
(Biϕm+1 ∧Bi(∧mk=1 Iijk ϕk))⊃¬(∧mk=1 Tijk ϕk) . (3)
This means that an agent does not trust all agents in a group if he believes they send him
some information which is jointly incompatible with his belief.
On the other hand, there are some non-theorems of the system deserving further
consideration. One notable example is if BA ϕ ⊃ ψ , could we infer BA Tij ϕ ⊃ Tijψ?
The intuition is that if we trust someone’s judgement on a fact ϕ, should we also trust his
judgement on a weaker fact ψ? At first sight, it seems tempting to have this as a derived
rule of our system because, according to C1, when an agent acquired information ϕ, he will
believe it due to the trust, so he will also believe the consequence ψ since he is a perfect
reasoner. However, this does not mean that he will also accept the belief ψ if he is only
informed of the fact ψ (less informative than ϕ). The situation can be illustrated by the
following example.
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Example 1. Let us consider a financial consultant j and a skeptical decision agent i , and
ϕ and ψ denote respectively the facts: “The financial situation of company X is excellent.”
and “It is worthwhile to invest in company X.” Then we may have Tij (ϕ ∧ (ϕ ⊃ ψ))
because i believes that j has the capability to judge the financial situation of a company
and the validity of the rules like ϕ ⊃ ψ . However, it is definitely not the case that i will
believe that company X deserves his investment just because j tells him so without any
justification, i.e., BiIijψ ⊃ Biψ is not true. In this case Tijψ should not hold, since
otherwise we get a contradiction by C1.
This example also shows that Tij (ϕ ∧ ψ) does not imply Tij ϕ or Tijψ . Conversely,
could we have (Tij ϕ ∧ Tijψ) ⊃ Tij (ϕ ∧ ψ)? The answer is also no because it is very
likely that we have both Tij ϕ and Tij¬ϕ at the same time, but we do not want to have
Tij⊥ as the result. When ϕ ∧ ψ is logically consistent, it seems more appealing to have
(Tij ϕ ∧ Tijψ) ⊃ Tij (ϕ ∧ ψ) derivable from our system. In this case, we can add the
following axiom
(Tij ϕ ∧ Tijψ)⊃ Tij (ϕ ∧ψ) if  ¬(ϕ ∧ψ).
However, since the axiom is subject to a non-derivability condition, it will make the system
unnecessarily complex. In fact, since the belief operator satisfies the conjunction axiom
Biϕ ∧ Biψ ⊃ Bi(ϕ ∧ ψ), the above axiom for trust operator is rarely needed. Therefore,
we do not stipulate such constraint in our logic. Instead, if the schema is true for some
given ϕ and ψ , then the particular instance should be added as a premise of the agent
specification.
Another derived rule shows that trust operators can play a role of filtering out noisy
information. This rule is as follows:
ϕ ⊃ψ
BiIij ϕ ∧ Tijψ ⊃ Biψ . (4)
In particular, we have
BA BiIij (ϕ ∧ψ)∧ Tijψ ∧Bi¬ϕ ⊃ Biψ. (5)
This means that even the whole piece of acquired information is contradictory with the
agent’s belief, he can still pick up some relevant part compatible with his belief.
Example 2. Let i denote a shopping agent who is in search of a digital camera and j a sale
agent on behalf of an electronic product dealer. When j tells i that the digital camera of
type AG007 is of high quality and low price, agent i may trust j that its price is indeed low
but not that its quality is high. In this case, ϕ denotes “The price of type AG007 is low”
and ψ “The quality of type AG007 is high”, then we have both BiIij (ϕ ∧ψ) and Tij ϕ but
not Tijψ(nor Tij (ϕ ∧ψ)), so Biϕ is derivable from the premises, though agent i does not
necessarily believe both ϕ and ψ .
3.1. Symmetric trust and transferable trust
In the preceding discussion, we mentioned that it is very likely that sometimes both
Tij ϕ and Tij¬ϕ hold. Let us elaborate on this point further. This occurs when agent i trusts
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the question-answering capability of j , so if i asks j whether fact ϕ holds, he is ready to
accept either the positive or the negative answer j gives. This is particularly true when the
agent is objective and neutral to the answer of any question. In artificial agent societies, this
property of trust is especially useful, so we have defined a special system for it. A basic BIT
model M = (W,π, (Bi )1in, (Iij )1i =jn, (Tij )1i =jn) is called symmetric if for all
w ∈W and 1 i = j  n, it satisfies:
(m3) for all S ⊆W if S ∈ Tij (w), then S ∈ Tij (w),
where S =W\S is the complement of S with respect to W . The class of symmetric models
is denoted by SY and the system SY will be the result of adding the following axiom to
BA:
C3: Tij ϕ ⊃ Tij¬ϕ.
The axiom C3 may not hold in the modeling of natural agents. For example, consider a
critic j who is a very critical book reviewer. It is rarely the case that the critic says a book
he reviews is good. Let ϕ denote the sentence “book X is very good”. Then as a reader,
agent i may trust j ’s judgement on ϕ being true but not the reverse, i.e., Tij ϕ ∧ ¬Tij¬ϕ
holds for this case.
A special case of symmetric trust occurs when each agent specializes in different
domain knowledge. For example, a medical agent specializes in health information,
whereas a legal agent in law information, and so on. To model this kind of situation, let us
assume Φ1, . . . ,Φn are pairwise disjoint subsets of Φ0, and L(Φi) is the set of BIT wffs
formed only by atomic symbols in Φi for all 1 i  n. Then we can formulate a kind of
trust, called topical trust, by the following nonstandard class of axioms:
Tij ϕ if  ϕ,  ¬ϕ,ϕ ∈ L(Φj ). (6)
This class of axioms is nonstandard in at least two senses. First, a standard axiom schema
can be instantiated by substituting any wffs into it, whereas the scope here is restricted
to the subset L(Φj ) for each j . Second, the applicability of each axiom in the class
depends on the non-derivability of ϕ and ¬ϕ which is related to the whole axiomatic
system including the axiom itself, so this makes the class of axioms not applicable in a
constructive way and will complicate the reasoning unnecessarily. Furthermore, it seems
also difficult to formulate a corresponding semantic constraint for the axioms, so we will
not include them as logical axioms of our system. Instead, if necessary, for some subset of
L(Φj )(for example, non-modal wffs), we can add Tij ϕ as the premises of reasoning for all
ϕ in that subset.
Another property of trust deserving special attention is its transferability. Consider the
following axiom:
C4: BiTjkϕ ⊃ Tikϕ.
This means that if i believes that j trusts k, then i will also trust k due to the endorsement
of j . This kind of trust will be called transferable trust. The system BA + C4 will be
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denoted by TR. The corresponding constraint on the semantics may be easily formulated
as follows:
(m4) ⋂u∈Bi (w) Tjk(u)⊆ Tik(w).
Let us call a basic model satisfying (m4) transferable model, and denote the class of all
transferable models by TR. Then we have
Theorem 2. Let L denote either SY or TR, then L ϕ iff |=L ϕ for any wff ϕ.
A direct consequence of C1 and C4 is
BiIij Tjkϕ ∧ Tij Tjkϕ ⊃ Tikϕ. (7)
This usually occurs in a recommendation system. When j recommends k to i by telling i
that he trusts k about ϕ and i is familiar enough with j so that upon receiving the message,
he knows that j is serious on the recommendation, then i would also trust k about ϕ due
to the endorsement of j .
The notion of transferability must be carefully distinguished with that of transitivity.
The latter is characterized by the following sentence
Tij ϕ ∧ Tjkϕ ⊃ Tikϕ. (8)
A consequence of (8) is
Tij ϕ ∧ Tjkϕ ∧BiIikϕ ⊃ Biϕ. (9)
An argument against transitivity of trust in a form like (9) is given in [13]. The main
argument is based on the fact that i can not know the communication between j and k, so
he does not know whether k has told j about ϕ. Thus even if i believes Tjkϕ, he has no
legitimate basis to conclude Bjϕ. Since the antecedent of (9) only contains BiIikϕ instead
of BiIij ϕ, i has no sufficient reason to believe ϕ if he doubts whether k has lied to him
(note that i does not trust k directly according to the antecedent of (9)). The argument in
fact also denies the validity of the following sentence
Tij ϕ ∧BiTjkϕ ∧BiIikϕ ⊃ Biϕ, (10)
which is derivable from the system TR.
In fact, what the argument reveals is that we should not expect that (10) holds universally
for any kind of trust. This is indeed the case in our system since (10) does not follow from
the basic system BA. However, it does not exclude the possibility that a special kind of
trust can satisfy the transferability property. In particular, as mentioned above, when an
agent would like to accept the recommendation of other agents, transferable trust would be
useful in modeling the situation.
3.2. Cautious trust
If we analyze the factors of trust in detail, we can find the following two conditions are
in general relevant for i to trust j on ϕ.
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Bi(Iij ϕ ⊃ Bjϕ), (11)
Bi(Bjϕ ⊃ ϕ). (12)
The first condition means that i believes that if j tells him ϕ then j himself believes ϕ,
i.e., j is honest to him and the second means that i believes that if j believes ϕ, then ϕ in
fact holds, i.e., j has good capability on evaluating the situation. Thus these two conditions
correspond to two main factors of trust, i.e., the honesty and capability of the trusted agent.
However, the two conditions are not necessary for an agent to commit himself to the trust
because he cannot always be sure about the honesty and capability of the agent he would
like to trust. For example, according to a past experience, he found that an agent was honest,
however, he can not guarantee the agent will remain honest in the future. As for capability,
any agent may make errors even if he has proved to be very capable in the past. Thus few
agents would trust others only when they completely satisfy the two conditions. An agent
will in general trust others if he has good confidence in their honesty and capability. For
agents who insist on trusting others only when the two conditions are satisfied, we can call
them cautious (or strict), and their trust is also called cautious (or strict). This is an ideal
form of trust, so we can define a new class of modal operators T cij as
T cij ϕ =def Bi
[
(Iij ϕ ⊃ Bjϕ)∧ (Bjϕ ⊃ ϕ)
]
. (13)
Interestingly, the cautious trust also satisfies the axioms C1 and C2.
Proposition 1. For any BIT wffs ϕ
(1) BA BiIij ϕ ∧ T cij ϕ ⊃ Biϕ.
(2) BA T cij ϕ ≡ BiT cij ϕ.
Proof. (1) Let ψ1 and ψ2 denote Iij ϕ and Bjϕ respectively, then, by substituting the
definition of T cij ϕ into the wff, the theorem reduces to
BA Biψ1 ∧Bi
(
(ψ1 ⊃ψ2)∧ (ψ2 ⊃ ϕ)
)⊃ Biϕ
and this can be proved by P, B1, R1, and R2.
(2) This is a corollary of the more general theorem BA Biψ ≡ BiBiψ which can be
proved by P, B1–B4 and R1. ✷
Since (13) is a very strict requirement for i to trust j on ϕ, it seems tempting to add the
following axiom to our basic system for cautious agents. The system (BA + C5) will be
denoted by CA.
C5: Tij ϕ ⊃ T cij ϕ.
Note that the axiom C5 is aimed at the modelling of cautious agents, so it does not hold for
general agents. This is why we do not include it as an axiom of the system BA. To add the
semantic constraint for C5, let us define a binary relation T cij ⊆W × 2W for every agent i
and j such that T cij (w,S) iff the following two conditions hold,
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(i) for u ∈ Bi (w), Iij (u)⊆ S implies Bj (u)⊆ S, and
(ii) for u ∈ Bi (w), if Bj (u)⊆ S, then u ∈ S.
Consequently, a model is called cautious if, for each w ∈W and 1 i = j  n,
(m5) Tij (w)⊆ T cij (w)
is satisfied.
Theorem 3. Let CA denote the class of all cautious models, then CA ϕ iff |=CA ϕ for any
wff ϕ.
On the other hand, should the converse of C5 also hold since it seems reasonable for
an agent to trust those with honesty and capability? Not necessarily because, if we add
the converse of C5 to our system, an unintended side-effect  Tij⊥ will be derived since
BA T cij⊥ holds. It seems counterintuitive for an agent to trust another agent from this
contradictory statement. This does not cause any problem in the agent’s belief since we
assume Iij is a KD modal operator, so Tij⊥ will not result in contradiction in the belief of
agent i . Nevertheless, this seems to suggest that the converse of C5 does not necessarily
hold for all rational trust. This is due to the fact that trust has some meaning of delegation
in the sense that if agent i trusts agent j on ϕ, then he delegates the decision of the truth of
ϕ to j .3 Now, if agent i can believe the honesty of j about the truth of ϕ, and the capability
of j in judging the truth of ϕ, then by a rational criteria, he can delegate the decision of
the truth of ϕ to j . However, even in this case, agent i can still decide not to delegate the
decision if he can decide the truth of ϕ by himself. In particular, when ϕ =⊥ or 	, agent i
can decide the truth value of ϕ since he is a perfect reasoner in our logic. In this regard, the
term “cautious trust” is somewhat abused to name the modal operator T cij since it is not a
special case of trust. More precisely, T cij is only a kind of quasi-trust. This also shows that
the derived operator T cij is not adequate to formulate the notion of trust, so we have to use
a primitive operator Tij in our logic.
4. Properties of information acquisition
4.1. Ideal communication environment
In axiom C1, we use BiIij ϕ instead of Iij ϕ directly in the antecedent. This is due to a
possibly insecure communication environment.
When i receives a message from j , if he can not exclude the possibility that someone
pretending to be j has sent the message, then he does not necessarily believe that he has
received the message from j . Thus we do not have Iij ϕ ⊃ BiIij ϕ. On the other hand, since
someone pretending to be j may send a message to i and make i wrongly believe that he
3 See [32] for a discussion of delegation logic in the context of computer system security.
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indeed received the message from j , BiIij ϕ ⊃ Iij ϕ does not necessarily hold, either. Now,
if digital signature and secure communication is used, then when i receives some message
with j ’s digital signature, he can believe this is indeed sent by j . When he believes j
has sent him the message by recognizing the digital signature of j , it is impossible that
it was counterfeit by another. Thus we have the following assumption under the ideal
environment.
C6: Iij ϕ ≡ BiIij ϕ.
The corresponding semantic constraint for C6 is:
(m6) Bi ◦ Iij = Iij .
A basic model satisfying (m6) will be called an ideal communication model, and the class
of such models is denoted by IC. The system IC is the result of adding C6 to BA and
replacing C1 with
C1′: Iij ϕ ∧ Tij ϕ ⊃ Biϕ.
Theorem 4. For any wff ϕ, IC ϕ iff |=IC ϕ.
4.2. Logic of utterance
In an ideal communication environment, if private communication is allowed, then it
is possible that Iij ϕ and Ikj¬ϕ hold at the same time. That is, agent j may tell one
agent the truth but lie to another. However, if the only communication channel among
the agents is a public one, i.e., an agent can tell others something only by announcing it in
public, then we can add both the axiom Iij ϕ ≡ Ikj ϕ and the semantic constraint that for all
1 i = j = k  n, Iij = Ikj and still have soundness and completeness results. However,
in this case, we can even further simplify the language of the BIT logic. For each j , the
class of operators I1j , . . . , Inj can be replaced by a single operator Uj . The meaning of
Uiϕ is then ”the agent i utters ϕ”. This is a logic of belief, utterance and trust (BUT). The
formation rules, semantics, and axiomatic system of BUT logic are obtained by replacing
Iij by Uj uniformly in those of BIT logic. The resultant axiomatic system is named BU and
is listed in Appendix A (see Figs. A.3 and A.4). Let CU6 denote the axiom Ujϕ ≡ BiUjϕ
and IU denote BU+CU6. Let (mu1) and (mu6) denote the results of replacing Iij by Uj in
(m1) and (m6) respectively and let BU (respectively IU) denote the classes of BUT models
satisfying (mu1) and (m2) (respectively (mu1), (m2) and (mu6)). Then we have
Theorem 5. Let L denote either BU or IU, then L ϕ iff |=L ϕ for any BUT wffs ϕ.
A logic for utterance and knowledge in the single-agent case has been proposed in [44]
for the analysis of the well-known liar paradox, where the epistemic operator is an S5
modal operator, and the utterance operator is a KD45 operator and an axiom like CU6
holds therein. Though the system (called KU there) is different from ours, it is similar to
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our IU to some extent, so we can also define a liar in IU or BU. Formally, an agent i is
called an intentional liar if Uiϕ ∧Bi¬ϕ is true, and an irresponsible liar if Uiϕ ∧¬Biϕ is
true. Obviously, an intentional liar is also an irresponsible one.
In the context of IU, an agent i is said to be honest4 if he is not a irresponsible liar
(i.e., Uiϕ ⊃ Biϕ for all ϕ of BUT logic), and frank if Biϕ ⊃ Uiϕ for all ϕ of BUT logic.
An extreme case where all agents are honest and frank may occur when all agents inform
others of their total belief. In this case, the operators Ui can be further removed from the
BUT logic and we can get a logic of belief and trust (BT). In the basic BT system (by
replacing all Ui by Bi ), we can prove the theorem
Bjϕ ∧ Tij ϕ ⊃ Biϕ. (14)
This means that if i trust j , then i will believe what j believes. If there is a mutual trust
between i and j , i.e., Tij ϕ∧Tjiϕ, then the belief of i and j is equivalent. The system BT is
useful in modeling a set of cooperative agents in which each agent has unlimited access to
other agents’ knowledge base. Then the beliefs of each agent would be directly influenced
by the beliefs of other agents according to his trust in them.
5. Related works
5.1. Trust in multi-agent systems
In [8], it is argued that trust is a notion of crucial importance for multi-agent systems.
While the authors regard trust as both a mental state, and a social attitude and relation,
we consider specifically the influence of trust on the assimilation of acquired information
into an agent’s belief. By using modal logic tools, we semantically and axiomatically
characterize the relationship among belief, information acquisition and trust. Among the
existing works on the application of the notion of trust to multi-agent systems, the one most
related to ours is [15]. In [15], trust is considered to be an attitude of an agent who believes
that another agent has a given property, so unlike in our definition, trust is analyzed as a
derived concept instead of a primitive one. The context of [15] is the same as ours. There is
a set of information sources, called agents, which can communicate with each other. Thus
there are three classes of modal operators for the agents. The first is for belief, denoted by
Bi , which is a KD normal modal operator.
The second is for strong belief, denoted by Ki , which is not only a KD normal modal
operator but also satisfied by the following axiom (KT)
Ki(Kiϕ ⊃ ϕ).
The relationship between belief and strong belief is characterized by the axiom (KB)
Kiϕ ⊃ Biϕ.
4 However, since we consider belief instead of knowledge, an honest agent may still make errors, so it is
possible Uiϕ ∧¬ϕ holds for an honest agent i.
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Since our belief operator Bi is a KD45 one, it also satisfies (KT). consequently, it plays
both roles of belief and strong belief operators. In other words, we do not distinguish
belief and strong belief in our logic. However, our belief operators satisfy more properties
than those in [15] (whether strong or not). In particular, it has positive and negative
introspection properties which are commonly accepted as the characterization of perfect
reasoners.
The third class of modal operators are for information action, where Ii,j ϕ denotes that
agent i has informed agent j about ϕ, so syntactically, there is a reverse in the direction of
information flow from our information acquisition operators (i.e., Iij ϕ = Ij,iϕ).5 However,
putting aside the tiny difference in syntax, the main difference between information action
operators and information acquisition ones is that the former are minimal modal operators
instead of normal ones. Thus the only property for Ii,j in [15] is the inference rule (RE).
(1) If  ϕ ≡ψ , then  Ii,j ϕ ≡ Ii,jψ .
Thus the information action operator will only consider the explicit information communi-
cated by some agent to another one. This is not enough for us since sometimes one agent
explicitly trusts only part of the information which is communicated to him by another. An
illustrative situation is given in Example 2 where both BiIij (ϕ ∧ψ) and Tij ϕ hold, but not
Tij (ϕ∧ψ), so if Iij is not a normal modal operator, we could not derive Biϕ by axiom C1.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the information action operator Ii,j satisfies axioms
(OBS1) Ii,j ϕ ⊃KjIi,j ϕ,
(OBS2) ¬Ii,j ϕ ⊃Kj¬Ii,j ϕ,
which are collectively equivalent to
KjIi,j ϕ ≡ Ii,j ϕ ≡¬Kj¬Ii,j ϕ.
The former is simply equivalent to our axiom C6 in system IC for an ideal communication
environment. Though the latter is also intuitively reasonable for an ideal communication
environment, it is not necessary for our aim of eliminating the modality Bi from the left
of the axiom C1. However, the axiom (OBS2) is important in the reasoning of trust on
completeness which is lacking in our framework.
Based on the basic modalities of belief, strong belief, and information action, different
sorts of trust are defined in [15]. These include sincerity, credibility, cooperativity,
vigilance, validity, and completeness.
Tsinci,j (ϕ)=def Ki(Ij,iϕ ⊃ Bjϕ),
Tcredi,j (ϕ)=def Ki(Bjϕ ⊃ ϕ),
Tvigii,j (ϕ)=def Ki(ϕ ⊃ Bjϕ),
Tcoopi,j (ϕ)=def Ki(Bjϕ ⊃ Ij,iϕ),
5 Note the comma between j and i.
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Tvali,j (ϕ)=def Tsinci,j (ϕ)∧ Tcredi,j (ϕ),
Tcompi,j (ϕ)=def Tvigii,j (ϕ)∧ Tcoopi,j (ϕ).
Regarding the two-fold roles played by our belief operators, the definitions of Tsinci,j (ϕ)
and Tcredi,j (ϕ) correspond exactly to Eqs. (11) and (12) (i.e., the honesty and capability
factors of a trust), so trust in the validity is just what we define as cautious trust T cij .
In proposition 1, it has been shown that cautious trust satisfies axioms C1 and C2.
Analogously, a counterpart of C1, Tvali,j (ϕ) ∧ KiIj,iϕ ⊃ Kiϕ also holds in the logic of
[15]. However, since Ki does not satisfy axioms like B3 and B4, the axiom C2 does not
have a counterpart for the notions of trust defined in [15]. This means that agents are not
necessarily self-aware of their trust.
Though the analysis of trust as a derived concept provides insightful understanding of
the notions, this will sometimes result in counter-intuitive consequences. For example,
by the normality of Ki , (OBS2), and the definition of trust on validity, we can derive
Tsinci,j (ϕ) from ¬Ij,iϕ. In other words, i trusts j for his sincerity on ϕ just because
j has not informed him of ϕ, though in practice, the definitions are only used in the
forward reasoning in the examples presented in [15]. This problem does not arise in
our system because we consider trust as a primitive concept and add appropriate axioms
for characterizing its relationship with some derived ones (e.g., C5) when necessary.
Furthermore, the primitive notion of trust may also accommodate some subjective factors
of trust, such as emotion.
Fairly speaking, the problem mentioned above is partly due to the use of material
implication in the definitions of different notions of trust. Thus, when generalizing them to
the graded ones, it is replaced by a conditional operator. For example, the trust level of i
about the sincerity of j on ϕ being α is defined as
Tsincαi,j (ϕ)=def Ki(Ij,iϕ⇒α Bjϕ),
where ⇒α is a binary connective in conditional logic [10]. Though the feature of graded
trust is completely absent in our logic, we think it would be more useful when combined
with information fusion operators [33]. It deserves further investigation to extend our logic
along this direction. (Also see Section 6 for further research in information fusion.)
When these varied types of trust are interpreted in a specific context of a database, they
may be used in expressing some properties of a database, such as informational validity
and completeness [7]. Let s and db be two agents denoting the system administrator and
the database, then Tcreds,db(ϕ) and Tvigis,db(ϕ) correspond respectively to “s knows db
is valid for ϕ” and “s knows db is complete for ϕ”. Nevertheless, the notions of trust are
also applicable to reasoning about the safety of information in a database. We will discuss
an application along this direction in Section 5.3.
5.2. Trust in agent communication language
The notions of trust have also been extensively used in Agent Communication
Language (ACL). ACL is important for multi-agent systems since the coordination and
collaboration between agents depends on effective inter-agent communication [9]. So
far, two main ACLs are KQML (Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language) and
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FIPA-ACL (Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents). The semantics for KQML is
given in [31], whereas that for FIPA-ACL is based on a quantified multi-modal logic
originally proposed in [14]. Both semantics depend on the speech act theory [38]. The main
primitives of an ACL are called performatives which are interpreted as communicative acts.
A communicative act can change the mental state of the receiver of a message just as an
ordinary act can change the physical state of the outside world. Therefore, the semantics
of each performative is specified by its precondition and effect.
Much effort has been spent on the semantics of ACLs [5,25,30,42,48] and, some of the
most important performatives, such as “INFORM” and “REQUEST”, have been precisely
defined. In particular, the performative INFORM is closely related to our information
acquisition operator. According to [25,30], the effect of INFORM is to construct mutual
belief between two agents under the sincerity and competence assumption of the message
sender. Formally, under the assumption that the sender agent x is sincere, the following
result holds
|= (DONE (INFORM x y ep t))∧ (MB x y ((BEL x p)⊃ p))⇒ (MB x y p), (15)
where ⇒ denotes a defeasible implication. By omitting the temporal and event parameters
t and e, the formula (DONE (INFORM x y e p t)) is roughly equivalent to Iyxp in our
logic, whereas the formula (BEL x p) is exactly Bxp in our logic. Though the mutual
belief operator MB is given by a fixed point definition, it is shown that (MB x y p) can be
thought of as an infinite conjunction of (BEL x p), (BEL y p), (BEL x (BEL y p)), . . . and
so on. Therefore, the first difference between INFORM act and our information acquisition
operator is that the former is aim to construct mutual belief between two agents which is
stronger than the receiver’s belief in the transmitted information.
While mutual belief is needed for coordination and collaboration, it is impossible in
some contexts. In particular, if an agent posts a message in a news group or mailing list, he
does not know who will receive it. Therefore, if the receiving agent does not reply directly
to the sending agent, it is impossible to construct mutual belief. However, it is still possible
that the receiving agent’s mental state can be changed by the message. Our characteristic
axiom C1 can be applied in such situations since it is stated from the viewpoint of the
receiving agent.
There are even arguments that mutual belief can never be established via message
transmission if the communication channel is not fully reliable [20,40,41]. However,
the difficulty can be overcome by use of default [28,30,36]. This is why the defeasible
implication ⇒ is used above. Since axiom C1 is simply a static constraint on the belief of
the receiving agent, we do not need the default assumption, and the ordinary implication
can be used.
The second difference between the notion of trust used in ACL and that defined in our
framework is that the former is defined by the sincerity and competence of the sending
agent instead of a primitive notion. For example, in [25], trust is explicitly defined as
(TRUST i j p)≡ (BEL i (BEL j p))⊃ (BEL i p)
which is weaker than the condition (12) for cautious trust. As argued in Section 3.2, it is
inadequate in some cases to treat trust as a derived notion from the belief on the sincerity
and competence of the sending agent.
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Finally, though trust is an important notion in the semantics of ACL, the interpretation
of ACL performatives and protocols needs a far more general theory of agency. While
some mental attitudes, such as intention and commitment, have been extensively studied
in ACL research, more research is needed to incorporate these notions into our logic.
5.3. Logics for information safety in database
An earlier attempt on the reasoning of information safety in database context has
been made in [12,16], resulting in the development of three logical systems S, S′, and
S′′. In the context of database management, there are some agents, called “information
sources”, which store messages in a database DB. These messages can be read by another
agent called “system”, who knows the meaning of every stored message. There is yet
another special agent, called DB administrator, who has the meta-information about the
reliability of the source agents. Two kinds of beliefs are distinguished by the system
agent: ordinary belief is the information incorporated into the database by any agents,
whereas true belief is only that inserted by reliable agents. To model this situation, a
modal logic S is first proposed in [16] based on the signaling act theory [26]. Then for
the purpose of computational implementation, two simplified versions of S, called S’ and
S” are proposed in [12]. Since S has the complete features of the sequence of logics, we
will focus our comparison to it. The logic includes the modalities Ei , Bs , Bi , Ks , and
Kadm for information source agents i , the system agent s and the administrator agent
adm. The modality Ei is called an action operator, so Eip means intuitively “agent i
brings it about that p”. The language of the logic is rather fine-grained in the sense that it
explicitly distinguishes the form and meaning of a message. However, by using an auto-
naming convention, a wff Ei(in.DB(′ϕ′)) is used to denote that agent i inserts a piece of
information ϕ into DB. The wff then corresponds to our information acquisition operator
Isiϕ (or Uiϕ since s is the only information receiver in the context of database) which
means that agent i sends information ϕ to the system agent. The modalities Bs and Bi are
exactly the belief operators in our language, and the knowledge (or true belief) operator
Ks is defined as Ksϕ = Bsϕ ∧ ϕ. Furthermore, Kadm is the knowledge operator for the
administrator agent.
In addition to the axioms for the action operators, four main axioms of logic S are as
follows:
• (OBS): Eip ⊃KsEip.
• (S): Ks(Ei(in.DB(′ϕ′))⊃ Biϕ).
• (BEL)6 : KsBiϕ ⊃KsBsϕ.
• (SAF): Kadm(Eip ⊃ q)⊃Ks(Eip ⊃ q).
Furthermore, the definition of safety operator is safe(i, ϕ)=def Kadm(Ei(in.DB(′ϕ′))⊃ ϕ).
6 In the presentation of S in [12], the axiom is given as KsBiϕ ⊃ KsBϕ, however, since Bϕ denote the
ordinary belief of the system, it should be equivalent to Bsϕ.
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In the axiom (OBS), if we substitute in.DB(′ϕ′) into p, then by using the correspon-
dence between Ei(in.DB(′ϕ′)) and Isiϕ and the definition of Ksϕ, we can derive
Isiϕ ⊃KsIsiϕ, (16)
which implies
Isiϕ ⊃ BsIsiϕ. (17)
This is just an instance of the forward implication of our axiom C6. On the other hand,
though the stronger property KsIsiϕ ⊃ Isiϕ holds trivially in S, it does not possess the
reverse implication of C6, i.e., BsIsiϕ ⊃ Isiϕ.
By our interpretation, the axiom (S) can be rewritten as
Ks(Isiϕ ⊃ Biϕ), (18)
which means that the system agent knows each agent i is honest. The (BEL) axiom
says that if s knows an agent i believes ϕ, then s knows he also believes it himself. By
combining (16), (18) and (BEL), we can derive
Isiϕ ⊃ Bsϕ. (19)
Thus the system agent will believe every piece of information he receives from any source
agents, no matter whether they are trustworthy. Since it is required that all belief operators
are KD45 ones in S, the source agents can not send jointly contradictory information to
the system. This is not compatible with the situation we would like to model in multi-
agent communication, though it is possible to impose such constraint in the database
management context.
The wff (19) is stronger than C1′ since it drops the condition Tsiϕ from the left side
of the implication. Thus the ordinary belief of the system agent is only a superset of
the information he received from any sources, and does not rely on the reliability of the
information sources. How the trust operator can play a role is in the formation of truth
belief. If we substitute p and q in axiom (SAF) with in.DB(′ϕ′) and ϕ respectively, then
by the definition of safe(i, ϕ), we can derive
safe(i, ϕ)⊃ (BsIsiϕ ⊃ Bsϕ), (20)
which is an instance of our C1 with safe(i, ϕ) corresponding to Tsiϕ. However, the
definition of safe(i, ϕ) in fact says more than this wff since it assures Isiϕ ⊃ ϕ, i.e., the
judgement of i on ϕ is fully trustworthy, by the fact that Ksp= Bsp ∧ p. Since the axiom
(S) has asserted the honesty of agent i , safe(i, ϕ) is actually closer to our cautious trust
T csiϕ.
Based on the comparison, we find that many important notions of the system S can also
be captured by our systems. This demonstrates the potential of applying our framework to
the database context. Furthermore, our framework provides more detailed analysis for the
properties of trust operators, so it is more appropriate for modeling of agent communication
and belief formation.
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5.4. Trust in computer securityThe notions of trust have played an important role in computer security. However, they
were usually used in an intuitive sense and not formally defined until the 1980s. One of the
earliest attempts to formalize the notions of trust in a modal logic framework is made in
[37]. In that formalization, the logic of belief is taken as the basis, and trust is defined as
a proper axiom added to the logic. Thus, in this logic, there are no operators for trust and
information acquisition as our logic has and trust is a derived notion in the framework. For
example, authenticity trust between agents i and j about the key of agent k is defined as
BiBjBk owner(keyk, k)⊃ BiBk owner(keyk, k),
which is derivable from Tij owner(keyk, k) in the system BT by R2, C2, B3, B4, and (14).
This shows that, even with strong assumptions (i.e., ideal communication environment and
the honesty and frankness of the agents), our logic can still derive some useful notions
of trust. Though the basic logic in [37] is very simple, a method to map a formal trust
specification to mechanisms for its implementation in distributed systems has been also
developed.
However, to analyze the notions of trust, the logic of belief is obviously inadequate since
it does not distinguish what an agent believes and what he says. Thus, a more expressive
logic is needed for finer analysis. One of the most important logics for the purpose is the
logic of authentication developed by Burrows, Abadi, and Needham [6], called BAN logic.
The logic has been subsequently refined and extended in some further works [1,43]. In
BAN logic, there are two operators closely related to our information acquisition and trust
operators. These are the said and controls operators. For the purpose of comparison, let us
translate them into the unary modal notations S and C, so
Siϕ = Pi said ϕ,
Ciϕ = Pi controls ϕ,
where Pi is the agent i , usually called principal in computer security literature. The rule
connecting said, controls, and believes operators is called the jurisdiction rule and is
formulated as
BiCjϕ ∧BiBjϕ ⊃ Biϕ (21)
in [6] and as
Cjϕ ∧ Sjϕ ⊃ ϕ (22)
in [43].7 By applying rule R2, we can derive from (22) the following
BiCjϕ ∧BiSjϕ ⊃ Biϕ. (23)
In BAN logic, it is usually assumed that principals are honest, so Sjϕ ⊃ Bjϕ holds and (23)
can also be derived from (21). It can be seen that (23) has some analogy with our axiom C1
(or CU1). Indeed, (23) can be viewed as a common intersection of the two variants of the
7 Note that we ignore the temporal parameters from the original formulation for simplicity.
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jurisdiction rule and our axiom C1 (and CU1) if we intuitively interpret BiCjϕ as “agent i
trusts j about ϕ”, and BiSjϕ as “i believes that j told him ϕ”.
In spite of the apparent analogy between axiom C1 (and CU1) and (23), we can not
overlook the conceptual difference between our logic and BAN logic. First, in BAN logic,
the control operator means the objective jurisdiction of an agent as described in (22), so
if Tij ϕ means that an agent i regards another agent j as an authority on ϕ, then it is
roughly equivalent to BiCjϕ in BAN logic. However, it has been also argued in [13] that
trust can not be identified with jurisdiction in all cases, so we need a primitive operator
for the representation of trust. Second, since the said operator in BAN logic is mainly
for transmitting messages for authentication, it can be assumed that principals are always
honest. However, in multi-agent systems which we would like to model, one agent may
cheat another for the interest of himself, so the honesty assumption does not automatically
hold in our logic. Third, said is in fact more like the utterance operator Ui in our system
BU since it only specifies the sender of the message. Thus, when it is used together with
the belief operator as in the wff BiSjϕ, it is implicitly assumed that the receiver of the said
operator is agent i . However, in [13], it is shown that sometimes the implicit assumption is
the source of some counterintuitive derivation, so the explicit specification of the receiver is
necessary. This is why our information acquisition operator is indexed by both the sending
and receiving agents. Finally, from a technical viewpoint, BAN logic is comparatively more
complicated (though also more expressive in some aspects) than ours. No completeness
proof of its axiomatic system is given, whereas our logic mainly concentrates on the basic
features of the trust, belief, and information acquisition operators, thus making complete
axiomatization possible. Furthermore, our axiomatic systems are rather modular in the
sense that further properties of trust can be added to the existing systems due to our choice
of neighborhood semantics for the trust operator.
5.5. A logic of delegation
It is mentioned above that trust has some sense of delegation. Recently, a delegation
logic [32] has been proposed for reasoning about the authorization decision in distributed
systems. In that logic (called D1LP), two kinds of statements are basic. The first, called
direct statement, is of the form
X says p
where X is a principal which roughly corresponds to an agent in our logic, and p is an
atomic formula in first-order logic. The second, called delegation statement, has the form
X delegates pˆd to PS
where X and p is as above, d is a positive integer or the asterisk symbol ‘∗’ representing
the delegation depth, and PS is a relatively complicated structure called principal structure
which can be viewed as a group of agents semantically. Roughly speaking, direct
statements correspond to belief modality, whereas delegation statements correspond to
trust in our logic. However, since there is no information acquisition modality in D1LP, the
interpretation of delegation statement is in fact closer to Eq. (14). Moreover, the common
restriction of both statements is that p must be an atomic formula in classical logic (or
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a literal when it is extended to D2LP, a delegation logic for handling negation) while we
allow any wffs in the scope of our modal operators. Though in the context of computer
security, this seems enough, we indeed have to represent more complex forms of formulas
such as nested modality in the information gathering context. On the other hand, D1LP
allows a more complicated structure for agents and agent groups. For example, agent i
may partly trust j1 and j2 individually but fully trust them jointly, so if j1 or j2 (but not
both) tell him ϕ individually, he will not entertain the belief. However, if they both tell
him the fact, then he will accept it. This seems to suggest a direction for further extension
of our logic by considering the notions of group trust. For example, let G be a subset of
{1,2, . . . , n} and k  |G| a natural number, then the trust operators can be generalized to
the form of TiG|k for anyG,k and i /∈G. The intuitive meaning of TiG|kϕ is that agent i will









∧ TiG|kϕ ⊃ Biϕ,
where G′ ranges over all k-element subsets of G.
6. Future work
Though we have discussed the notion of trust extensively, many interesting problems
still remain untouched in the presentation above. In this section, we briefly remark on
some of these possible research directions.
First, the dual parts of sincerity, credibility, and validity, i.e., respectively, cooperativity,
vigilance, and completeness defined in [15] are totally lacking in our logic. Research in
this area may be very useful in the reasoning of closed-world databases. For example, if
j is a database agent monitoring the train timetable, i is a client agent who believes that
j would inform him the time of all departure trains, and i does not inform j of a train
departure at 3:50, then j will believe that there is not one. This dual kind of trust may need
axioms such as
Tij ϕ ∧Biϕ ⊃ BiIij ϕ.
Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate how our framework can be extended with these
dual notions of trust.
Second, as mentioned in Section 5.1, a research direction related to graded trust
is information fusion in which an agent must decide what to accept among possibly
inconsistent information from different sources with various degrees of reliability. In
multi-source reasoning [11], it is shown how literal information can be merged, and it
is suggested that for information of general form, the belief revision approach of Katsuno
and Mendelzon [29] can be used. In [33], multi-source reasoning logic is extended with
the distributed knowledge operator of multi-agent epistemic logic [20] so that the belief of
different agents can be merged according to their degrees of reliability. However, since
information acquisition operators are not included in that logic, it can not model the
notion of agent communication. On the other hand, in BIT logic, trust is only a qualitative
52 C.-J. Liau / Artificial Intelligence 149 (2003) 31–60
notion, so it will be interesting to generalize it quantitatively or ordinally so that we can
merge acquired information from sources with various degrees of reliability. Therefore,
the integration of these two logics will produce one with richer expressive power. Some
preliminary work along this direction has been done in [18].
Third, in Section 3.1, a special case of symmetry trust, called topical trust, is considered
without standard axiomatization. This problem may be remedied by introducing the topics
of propositions into the language. For example, in a logic for aboutness [17], a sorted binary
predicate A(t, ‘p’) is used to denote “sentence ‘p’ is about topic t”. If our BIT language is
extended with such a predicate, then we can formulate axioms as: A(t, ‘ϕ’)⊃ Tij ϕ when
j is specialized at topic t , or more strongly, as: (A(t1, ‘ϕ’)∨ · · ·∨A(tk, ‘ϕ’))≡ Tij ϕ when
the set of topics at which j is specialized are {t1, . . . , tk}. However, further research is
needed to see how the semantics can be changed to accommodate this syntactic extension.
Forth, we will consider the dynamics of information acquisition. So far, the Iij operators
only describe the static fact that some information is acquired. However, we can also
consider how information acquisition action causes the transition of the belief state. There
are essentially two way to do this. One is to index the modal operators with a time stamp
so thattϕ means thatϕ holds in time t for any modal operator= Bi,Tij , or Iij . Then
we can have a dynamic counterpart of C1 as follows:
Bti I
t
ij ϕ ∧ T tij ϕ ∧¬Bti¬ϕ ⊃ Bt+1i ϕ.
The other way is to use the dynamic logic framework [23]. Let [Iij ϕ] denote a dynamic
operator for each 1  i = j  n and wff ϕ. We can try to develop an update semantics
for these operators [47] along the direction of the works reported in [22,45,46]. Then the
above axiom is rewritten as
Tij ϕ ∧¬Bi¬ϕ ⊃ [Iij ϕ]Biϕ.
Fifth, though axiomatic systems provide an elegant characterization of the notions
we want to model, some more realistic proof methods, such as tableau methods,
Gentzen sequent calculus, or resolution methods, must be developed for the purpose of
implementation. In this regard, the approaches adopted in [3,4,21] are ideal starting points.
Last, though we mainly consider the influence of trust on the acceptance of acquired
information as belief, on the reverse, we can also try to induce the trust degree of an agent
according to how much information acquired from him has been accepted as belief in the
past. To do this, we must first add the temporal dimension to the semantics of our logic.
Then the trust degree of i on j at time t , denoted by dtij :W →[0,1] can be defined by
dtij (w)=
|{ϕ :w, t − 1 |= Biϕ ∧ Iij ϕ}|
|{ϕ :w, t − 1 |= Iij ϕ}| .
This formula can be seen as a realization of the trust update function introduced in [27]
where the experience values used in [27] are concretely computed as the proportion of
information accepted by the receiving agent. However, according to the current semantics
of Iij , it is an implicit information acquisition operator, so {ϕ : w, t − 1 |= Iij ϕ} is in
general infinite. Thus, to make the definition meaningful, we should only consider the
explicit information acquired by i from j . This means that we will change the semantics
of Iij to a minimal one, and require that Iij (w) is finite for any w ∈W . In this way, it is
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expected to model the quite complicated phenomenon of multi-agent communication with
different trust degrees in a logical system.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we characterize the notions of trust, belief, and information acquisition
for multi-agent systems in a modal logic framework. Some different properties of trust and
information acquisition operators are discussed and axiomatized, showing the usefulness of
logical tools in formulating the properties of multi-agent systems. The proposed framework
is also compared with related works in computer security and database management,
demonstrating the potential applications of our logic in such fields.
The logic framework presented in this paper can guide the implementation of multi-
agent systems in the following way. The logic provides a rigorous semantics for the notions
of trust, information acquisition, and belief, and characterizes the relationship among these
notions precisely. Therefore, it is possible to verify whether an agent system actually
complies with the semantics if the states of the system can be appropriately connected with
the mental states of agents. A general framework for ascribing knowledge (or belief) in
multi-agent systems has been proposed in [20]. The basic principle is to construct a Kripke
model by the inter-agent communication history. The information acquisition operator can
be easily interpreted in such a system if each agent can remember the information he
has received. Also, since we adopt a minimal semantics for the trust operator, it can be
interpreted in such a system if each agent i has a knowledge base KBi such that each
element of KBi is of the form (j,ϕ) which means that Tij ϕ holds. In this way, each
agent can reason about the mental states of himself and other agents, so that a multi-
agent system complying with the semantics provided in this paper can be implemented
by the knowledge-based program proposed in [20]. Though this is only a rough guideline
for the design of multi-agent systems based on our semantics, it is expected that detail
implementation will further confirm the principle.
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Appendix A. Proof of theorems
The theorems to be proved in this appendix all concern soundness and completeness of
logical systems. For the ease of reference, we list the above-mentioned model constraints
and axioms in Figs. A.1–A.4 and include their correspondence with the system names in
Table A.1. In Table A.1, we add two core systems L0 and LU0 as the origin of our axiomatic
systems, where L0 is just the BA system without the connection axioms C1 and C2, and
LU0 is the result of replacing Iij in L0 by Uj . Thus all our systems are the result of adding
some connection axioms in Fig. A.4 to these two core systems.
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Table A.1
The correspondence between axioms and model constraints
Modalities System Axioms Constraints Completeness
Bi,Tij , Iij L0 P, B1–B4, I1–I2, R1–R3 none ∗
BA L0 + C1–C2 m1–m2 Thm 1
SY L0 + C1–C3 m1–m3 Thm 2
TR L0 + C1–C2, C4 m1–m2, m4 Thm 2
CA L0 + C1–C2, C5 m1–m2, m5 Thm 3
IC L0 + C1′, C2, C6 m1–m2, m6 Thm 4
Bi,Tij ,Ui LU0 replace Iij by Uj in L0 none ∗
BU LU0 +CU1, C2 mu1, m2 Thm 5
IU LU0 +CU1′, C2, CU6 mu1, m2, mu6 Thm 5
(m1) for all S ∈ Tij (w), if Bi ◦ Iij (w)⊆ S, then Bi (w)⊆ S.
(m2) Tij (w)=
⋂
u∈Bi (w) Tij (u).
(m3) for all S ⊆W if S ∈ Tij (w), then S ∈ Tij (w).
(m4) ⋂u∈Bi (w) Tjk(u)⊆ Tik(w).
(m5) Tij (w)⊆ T cij (w).
(m6) Bi ◦ Iij = Iij .
(mu1) for all S ∈ Tij (w), if Bi ◦ Uj (w)⊆ S, then Bi (w)⊆ S.
(mu6) Bi ◦ Uj = Uj .
Fig. A.1. The model constraints.
1. Axioms:
P: all tautologies of the propositional calculus
B1: [Biϕ ∧Bi(ϕ ⊃ψ)] ⊃ Biψ
B2: ¬Bi⊥
B3: Biϕ ⊃ BiBiϕ
B4: ¬Biϕ ⊃Bi¬Biϕ
I1: [Iij ϕ ∧ Iij (ϕ ⊃ψ)] ⊃ Iij ψ
I2: ¬Iij⊥
2. Rules of Inference:
R1 (Modus ponens, MP): from  ϕ and  ϕ ⊃ψ infer ψ
R2 (Generalization, Gen): from  ϕ infer  Biϕ and  Iij ϕ
R3: from  ϕ ≡ψ infer  Tij ϕ ≡ Tij ψ
Fig. A.2. The axiomatic system L0.
As usual, the verification of soundness is a routine checking of the validity of the axioms
and the validity-preservation of the inference rules in respective systems, so it is left up to
the readers to check. For the completeness part, Let L denote one of our logical systems and
L denote its corresponding class of models. A wff ϕ is L-inconsistent if its negation¬ϕ can
be proved in L. Otherwise, ϕ is L-consistent. A set Σ of wffs is said to be L-inconsistent if
there is a finite subset {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk} ⊆Σ such that the wff ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕk is L-inconsistent;
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1. Axioms:
P: all tautologies of the propositional calculus
B1: [Biϕ ∧Bi(ϕ ⊃ψ)] ⊃ Biψ
B2: ¬Bi⊥
B3: Biϕ ⊃ BiBiϕ
B4: ¬Biϕ ⊃Bi¬Biϕ
U1: [Uiϕ ∧Ui(ϕ ⊃ψ)] ⊃Uiψ
U2: ¬Ui⊥
2. Rules of Inference:
R1 (Modus ponens, MP): from  ϕ and  ϕ ⊃ψ infer ψ
RU2 (Generalization, Gen): from  ϕ infer  Biϕ and Uiϕ
R3: from  ϕ ≡ψ infer  Tij ϕ ≡ Tij ψ
Fig. A.3. The axiomatic system LU0.
C1: BiIij ϕ ∧ Tij ϕ ⊃ Biϕ.
C2: Tij ϕ ≡ BiTij ϕ.
C3: Tij ϕ ⊃ Tij¬ϕ.
C4: BiTjkϕ ⊃ Tikϕ.
C5: Tij ϕ ⊃ T cij ϕ.
C6: Iij ϕ ≡ BiIij ϕ.
C1′: Iij ϕ ∧ Tij ϕ ⊃ Biϕ.
CU1: BiUj ϕ ∧ Tij ϕ ⊃ Biϕ.
CU1′: Ujϕ ∧ Tij ϕ ⊃ Biϕ.
CU6: Ujϕ ≡ BiUjϕ.
Fig. A.4. Additional axioms.
otherwise, Σ is L-consistent. A maximal L-consistent set of wffs (L-MCS) is a consistent
set χ of wffs such that whenever ψ is a wff not in χ , then χ ∪ {ψ} is L-inconsistent.
On the other hand, ϕ is L-satisfiable iff there exists a model M in L and a possible
world w such that w |=M ϕ, otherwise ϕ is L-unsatisfiable. Sometimes the prefix L will
be omitted without confusion. To prove the completeness, we will show that every L-
consistent wff is L-satisfiable. To prove the result, we use the standard canonical model
construction technique in modal logic [10]. Let us first consider the case where L is an
extension of L0. The case for LU0-extended systems can be proved in an analogous way.
A canonical L-model M∗ = (W,π, (Bi )1in, (Iij )1i =jn, (Tij )1i =jn) is such
that
• W = {wχ | χ is an L-MCS}, in other words, each possible world corresponds precisely
to an L-MCS.
• π :Φ0 → 2W is defined by π(p)= {wχ | p ∈ χ}.
• Bi (wχ1,wχ2) iff χ1/Bi ⊆ χ2, where χ1/Bi = {ϕ | Biϕ ∈ χ1}.
• Iij (wχ1 ,wχ2) iff χ1/Iij ⊆ χ2, where χ1/Iij = {ϕ | Iij ϕ ∈ χ1}.
• Tij (wχ )= {[ϕ] | Tij ϕ ∈ χ}, where [ϕ] = {wχ ′ | ϕ ∈ χ ′}.
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Note that by this construction, we can show that [ϕ] = [ψ] implies L ϕ ≡ψ . If L ϕ ≡ψ ,
then either ϕ ∧ ¬ψ or ¬ϕ ∧ ψ is L-consistent. In either case, we can have an L-MCS
containing one of ϕ or ψ but not the other, so [ϕ] = [ψ]. Therefore, we can have
[ϕ] ∈ Tij (wχ ) iff Tij ϕ ∈ χ which will be used implicitly in the proof of some lemmas
below.
In what follows, we will first show that a canonical L-model is indeed a model in L0.
Lemma A.1.
(1) Each Bi in a canonical L-model is serial, transitive, and Euclidean.
(2) Each Iij in a canonical L-model is serial.
Proof. These results can be easily proved by the axioms B2–B4 and I2. We show the
transitivity of Bi as an example. If both Bi (wχ1,wχ2) and Bi (wχ2,wχ3) hold, then for any
Biϕ ∈ χ1, we have BiBiϕ ∈ χ1 by axiom B3, so Biϕ ∈ χ2 and ϕ ∈ χ3 by the definition of
Bi . Thus χ1/Bi ⊆ χ3, and so Bi (wχ1 ,wχ3) holds. ✷
The most important result for such construction is the truth lemma.
Lemma A.2 (Truth lemma). For any wff ϕ and L-MCS χ , we have wχ |=M∗ ϕ iff ϕ ∈ χ .
Proof. By induction on the structure of the wff, the only interesting case is the wff of the
form ψ for some modality = Bi, Iij or Tij . Let us take = Bi and Tij as examples.
First, for  = Bi , by definition, wχ |=M∗ Biψ iff for all wχ ′ ∈ Bi (wχ ), wχ ′ |=M∗ ψ
iff for all χ/Bi ⊆ χ ′, ψ ∈ χ ′ (by induction hypothesis) iff χ/Bi ∪ {¬ψ} is L-inconsistent
iff Biψ ∈ χ when Bi is a normal modal operator [10]. However, by the axioms P and B1,
rules MP and Gen, Bi is indeed a normal modal operator.
Second, for  = Tij , by definition of satisfaction, wχ |=M∗ Tijψ iff |ψ| ∈ Tij (wχ )
iff [ψ] ∈ Tij (wχ ) (by induction hypothesis) iff Tijψ ∈ χ by the definition of canonical
models. ✷
By combining these two lemmas, it has sufficed to prove that L0 is complete. For
if L0 ϕ, then ¬ϕ is L0-consistent, so we can find an L0-MCS containing ¬ϕ and
consequently, ϕ is not valid in the canonical model, i.e., |=L0 ϕ. To prove that L is complete
for L = BA, SY, TR, CA, IC, we must show that the respective canonical model is in the
corresponding model class.
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma A.3. The canonical BA-model M∗ is in BA.
Proof. We will verify that the constraints (m1) and (m2) are satisfied.
C.-J. Liau / Artificial Intelligence 149 (2003) 31–60 57
(1) (m1): if [ϕ] ∈ Tij (wχ ) and Bi ◦ Iij (wχ) ⊆ [ϕ], then by definition, Tij ϕ ∈ χ and ϕ is
in every BA-MCS containing Σ =def {ψ | BiIijψ ∈ χ}. From the latter, it follows that
there exist ψ1, . . . ,ψk ∈Σ such that
BA (ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ψk)⊃ ϕ.
Thus by axioms P, B1, I1, and rules R1 and R2, it follows that BiIij ϕ ∈ χ . Then by
the axiom C1, Biϕ ∈ χ also holds. This means that for any wχ ′ ∈ Bi (wχ), ϕ ∈ χ ′, i.e,
wχ ′ ∈ [ϕ], so Bi (wχ)⊆ [ϕ].
(2) (m2): [ϕ] ∈ Tij (wχ ) iff Tij ϕ ∈ χ iff BiTijϕ ∈ χ (by C2) iff Tij ϕ ∈ χ ′ for any χ ′ such
that wχ ′ ∈ Bi (wχ ) iff [ϕ] ∈⋂u∈Bi (wχ ) Tij (u). ✷
Then Theorem 1 follows directly from Lemmas A.1–A.3.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma A.4.
(1) The canonical SY-model M∗ is in SY.
(2) The canonical TR-model M∗ is in TR.
Proof.
(1) To prove that M∗ satisfies (m3), assume that [ϕ] ∈ Tij (wχ ), then Tij ϕ ∈ χ and so
Tij¬ϕ ∈ χ by C3. Thus [ϕ] = [¬ϕ] ∈ Tij (wχ).
(2) To prove that M∗ satisfies (m4), assume that [ϕ] ∈⋂wχ ′ ∈Bi (wχ ) Tjk(wχ ′), then Tjkϕ ∈
χ ′ for any χ ′ such that χ/Bi ⊆ χ ′ by definition of Bi and Tjk , so Tjkϕ ∈ χ/Bi
and BiTjkϕ ∈ χ . Therefore, by axiom C4, it can be derived that Tikϕ ∈ χ , so [ϕ] ∈
Tik(wχ ). ✷
Then Theorem 2 follows directly from Lemmas A.1, A.2, and A.4.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma A.5. The canonical CA-model M∗ is in CA.
Proof. To verify that the model satisfies (m5), we assume [ϕ] ∈ Tij (wχ ), then Tij ϕ ∈ χ ,
so by axiom C5 and the definition of T cij , we have Iij ϕ ⊃ Bjϕ ∈ χ ′ and Bjϕ ⊃ ϕ ∈ χ ′ for
any wχ ′ ∈ Bi (wχ ). From the former, it follows that if Iij (wχ ′)⊆ [ϕ], then Bj (wχ ′)⊆ [ϕ]
and from the latter, it follows that if Bj (wχ ′)⊆ [ϕ], then wχ ′ ∈ [ϕ] for wχ ′ ∈ Bi (wχ ), so
[ϕ] satisfies the two conditions for T cij (wχ , [ϕ]), i.e., [ϕ] ∈ T cij (wχ ). ✷
Then Theorem 3 follows directly from Lemmas A.1, A.2, and A.5.
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A.4. Proof of Theorem 4Lemma A.6. The canonical IC-model M∗ is in IC.
Proof. To verify that the model satisfies (m6), we need only note that Bi ◦ Iij (wχ1,wχ2)
iff χ1/BiIij ⊆ χ2, where χ1/BiIij = {ϕ | BiIij ϕ ∈ χ1}. Then by axiom C6, we have
χ1/BiIij = χ1/Iij , so the result follows immediately. For the constraints (m1), since the
axiom C1’ is equivalent to C1 according to axiom C6, so the result proved in Lemma A.3
still holds. ✷
A.5. Proof of Theorem 5
To prove the theorem, the canonical model constructed in the beginning of the appendix
must be modified slightly. We merely have to replace Iij with Ui with the following
definition:
• Ui (wχ1 ,wχ2) iff χ1/Ui ⊆ χ2, where χ1/Ui = {ϕ |Uiϕ ∈ χ1}.
Then Lemma A.1 (with each Ui being serial) and Lemma A.2 also hold for the canonical
LU0-model. Since BU and IU are extensions of LU0, we must only prove the following
lemma to finish the proof of Theorem 5.
Lemma A.7.
(1) The canonical BU-model M∗ is in BU.
(2) The canonical IU-model M∗ is in IU.
Proof. The proof that the canonical BU-model satisfies (mu1) and (m2) is analogous to
that for Lemma A.3, and that the canonical IU-model satisfies (mu1), (m2), and (mu6) is
analogous to that for Lemma A.6. ✷
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